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Abstract
Re´dei and san Pedro discuss my “Comparing Causality Principles,” their
main aim being to distinguish reasonable weakened versions of two causality
principles presented there, “SO1” and “SO2”. They also argue that the proof
that SO1 implies SO2 contains a flaw. Here, a reply is made to a number of
points raised in their paper. It is argued that the “intuition” that SO1 should
be stronger than SO2 is implicitly based on a false premise. It is pointed out
that a similar weakening of SO2 was already considered in the original paper.
The technical definition of the new conditions is shown to be defective. The
argument against the stronger versions of SO1 and SO2 given by Re´dei and
san Pedro is criticised. The flaw in the original proof is shown to be an easily
corrected mistake in the wording. Finally, it is argued that some cited results
on causal conditions in AQFT have little relevance to these issues, and are, in
any case, highly problematic in themselves.
In [3] I presented a framework within which some problems surrounding Bell’s local
causality condition and Reichenbach’s Principle of Common Cause (PCC) could be
addressed. The main aim was to clarify the relation between variants of the causal
condition that is used in the derivation of the Bell inequalities. The central idea
behind the more technical side of the work was the following: that various conditions
in the literature claimed as alternatives to Bell’s are either equivalent, or stronger
in the sense that they incorporate inessential extra restrictions, or could be shown
to be inadequate in a clear way. In this connection, the main results in the paper
strengthen the justification of Bell’s causal condition, and defend the significance of
Bell’s theorem against the possibility of replacing local causality with some weaker
alternative.
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Central to the discussion are two causality principles that can be defined in that
framework, SO1 and SO2. Essentially, the two conditions are as follows ([3] contains
more exact definitions, and the definitions of other terms used below). Consider two
spacelike separated regionsA and B in a spacetime S. A “screening off” type condition
states that any pair of probabilistic events A and B occurring in any such regions
A and B respectively will be uncorrelated once probabilities are conditioned on any
“full specification” of events in the relativistic past. The past region can be defined
in different ways. For SO1 the region is the “mutual past” P1 = J
−(A) ∩ J−(B),
where J−(A) is the causal past of A, while SO2 uses the larger “joint past” region
P2 = J
−(A) ∪ J−(B)\(A ∪ B), where \ is set difference. In [3], proofs are provided
that these conditions are equivalent.
Re´dei and san Pedro [4] take issue with the equivalence result using two main
arguments. Firstly, they state that the “equivalence seems counterintuitive” in that
SO2 should intuitively be weaker than SO1, and cite results on causal principles in
AQFT that seem consistent with the intuition. The proposed solution is that SO2
should be replaced by a similar but weaker condition. Secondly they find fault with
the proof that SO1 implies SO2.
Simpson’s paradox repeated. The common intuition that SO2 must be the
weaker condition is based, it seems, on the idea that conditioning on more events
in the past can only make more pairs of events uncorrelated, not less. If this was
true then SO1 would easily imply SO2, but equivalence would be in doubt. This
reasoning is incorrect, however. Uncorrelated events can become correlated once
probabilities are conditioned on past events, leading to the so-called “Simpson para-
dox” [7]. Because of this, if arguments that SO2 implies SO1 seem endangered by
causes of future correlations lying outside P1, then arguments that SO2 implies SO1
should seem equally endangered by a Simpson’s “paradox” brought on by events out-
side P1. An argument along these lines is touched on in [3] before the equivalence
proof is given.
Finite SO2 and SO2w. The weakened conditions proposed by Re´dei and san
Pedro are called “finite SO1” and “finite SO2”. The weakening consists in restricting
the set of regions to which the condition applies, allowing correlations between events
in certain spacelike regions that are not subject to the screening off condition. The
regions to which finite SO1 and finite SO2 do not apply are “causally infinite” regions
A such that the causal closure of A contains its own causal past (see [4] for details).
This is claimed to rule out regions like J−(B)\J−(A) which would, if correct, prevent
the equivalence proofs in [3] from applying to the new finite conditions.
A similar variant of SO2, which is not mentioned in [4], was considered in section
2.4 of [3]. There SO2w is defined, in which the regions A and B are restricted
to be regions that “are of finite extent and do not contain any part of the initial
hypersurface”. Re´dei and san Pedro’s finite SO2 condition has the advantage that it
is defined purely with respect to the causal relation on the the set of spacetime points,
which in my original paper was the only structure explicitly given to the “spacetime”
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S, whereas mention of “finite extent” implicitly uses more structure. Finite SO1 is
also new. Beyond that, the conditions are clearly very similar, at least in intent.
“Causal finiteness” is defective. However, the definition of the term “causally
finite” does not do the intended job, even in the intuitive case referred to in [4], that
is, 2D Minkowski space. The problem is illustrated in figure 1. Let us use light-cone
co-ordinates u = t + x and v = t − x in this space. Consider a region defined by
u ≥ 0, v ≤ 0 and u ≤ u∗ where u∗ is positive. This region corresponds to the region
B ∪Y in Figure 1 of [4], and for brevity it will be called O here. It extends infinitely
into the past in an obvious sense. Re´dei and san Pedro claim that such regions are
also causally infinite in the sense of their definition. However, the causal complement
O′ is the set of all points such that u < 0 and v > 0, and so the causal closure
(O′)′ is the quadrant defined by u ≥ 0, v ≤ 0. This causal closure region (O′)′ does
not contain its own past, and so O is causally finite by their definition. Thus, in
2D Minkowski space at least, the proof of the equivalence of SO1 and SO2 actually
does carry over to the “finite” conditions! This undermines the motivation for the
definition of “Causal finiteness”.
Figure 1: A spacetime diagram showing the problem with the definition of causal finite-
ness. The region O corresponds to the region B ∪ Y in Figure 1 of [4], which the authors
claim to be causally finite. The diagram shows the causal complement of this region O′,
and the causal closure (O′)′. It is easy to see that the causal closure (O′)′, which is the
quadrant to the right in the diagram, does not contain its own past.
It is certainly worthwhile to consider the consequences of modifying SO1 and
SO2. But before analysing “finite” SO1 and SO2, we first need to improve on the
definitions. When this task is completed, the more substantial questions can be dealt
with.
Motivation for finite SO1 and SO2 is problematic. However, even given that
this technical problem can be resolved, the motivation given for preferring the alter-
native conditions is questionable. Briefly, Re´dei and san Pedro state that a causally
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infinite region “might very well be empirically inaccessible in its entirety... hence
one might not be in the position to decide empirically whether [an event in that
region] has happened or not”. Hence events in such regions should not be subject to
screening-off conditions, they argue.
This argument depends on a strong epistemic interpretation of the idea of “do-
mains of decidability” from [3], that is, that they should be understood as the regions
to which we would have to have access in order to know whether the event had oc-
curred or not. Butterfield ([2], footnote 3, p.6) makes a compelling criticism of the
use of epistemic language in [3]. It is, he states, a “gloss” that would be unnecessary,
were it not an attempt to avoid the need to bring in the difficult notion of events
being “intrinsic” to regions (an attempt which in any case fails). If we agree, and
accept that “domains of decidability” should not be thought of epistemically, the
argument given above cannot be carried through. There is a further problem with
the argument: Re´dei and san Pedro’s finite SO1 and SO2 conditions still allow events
whose least domain of decidability is causally infinite to be conditioned on, but they
have argued against causally infinite least domains of decidability in general.
SO1 does imply SO2. In section 5 of their paper Re´dei and san Pedro challenge
the proof that SO1 implies SO2. Rather than a being substantial error, however, this
boils down to an erroneous restatement, in the explanation of the proof, of a result
proved earlier in the paper. Correcting the restatement completes the proof.
The first part of the proof in [3] shows that, if we assume SO1, any pair of events
A and B in any spacelike regions A and B will be uncorrelated when probabilities are
conditioned on any full specifications of three particular disjoint regions, the union of
which is the joint past P2. The last part of the proof offered is the following: “[f]rom
corollary 1, if C ∈ Φ(P1), X ∈ Φ(X ) and Y ∈ Φ(Y) then C ∩X ∩ Y ∈ Φ(P2)” where
Φ(A) refers to the set of full specifications of A. That is, if we condition on any
full specification of the three regions, that is equivalent to conditioning on some full
specification of their union, and this is claimed to complete the proof. Re´dei and san
Pedro rightly point out that this is not the same as saying that any full specification
of P2 is equal to the union of some such triple of full specifications C, X and Y for
the corresponding disjoint regions, which is what we need to show that SO2 holds.
However, when we return to corollary 1 to see what is actually says, we discover that
it does indeed complete the proof. Corollary 1 is as follows: “if R =
⊔
i
Ai for some
finite set of regions Ai, then a full specification F of R can be written F =
⋂
i
Ai
where Ai is a full specification of Ai”. Here ⊔ signifies a disjoint union. The meaning
is that any full specification F of R can be written in this way. This corollary is
saying exactly what Re´dei and san Pedro point out is missing from the proof. The
error, such as it is, consists in explaining the content of corollary 1 incorrectly. So
while the objection helps to clarify the proof, the problem is not substantial.
Thus the equivalence between the original forms of SO1 and SO2 is not actually
in danger. However, the conjecture that finite SO1 implies finite SO2 is also referred
to as “likely true and intuitively plausible” in section 5 of [4], while the opposite im-
plication is considered less likely to hold. An intuition refined in the face of Simpson’s
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paradox should find no obvious reason to consider one of the implications more likely
to be true than the other (even ignoring the problems with the definition of casual
finiteness).
Results from AQFT have limited relevance. Re´dei and san Pedro go on to
review some results on causal conditions in algebraic quantum field theory (AQFT),
claiming that they provide some evidence for relations between the screening off
conditions, for example that finite SO2 is strictly weaker than the original SO2. It is
misguided to compare results based on AQFT to results in the framework presented
in [3] in this way, for a number of reasons.
Not only the comparison, but also the general significance of the cited results, is
questionable. Citing [5] in section 5 of their paper, Re´dei and san Pedro state that
if AQFT satisfies a certain condition, “the finite SO2 holds in AQFT” in “a specific
sense” which they then specify. The causal principle referred to is a statement in
the AQFT framework, analogous in form to Reichenbach’s original statement of the
Principle of Common Cause (definition 2 in [5]), with the relativistic joint past as
the definition of the past region. It is surprising to see this referred to as a version
of SO2, in any sense, in a paper based on a detailed reading of [3]. The first half of
[3], leading up to the definitions of SO1 and SO2, deals explicitly and at length with
this condition. The original PCC condition is contrasted in detail with screening off
conditions. The conclusion is reiterated here to avoid any ambiguity: Reichenbach’s
original PCC suffers from numerous inadequacies when applied in this manner. Doing
so leads to absurdities: this principle rules out many manifestly causal situations and
is vulnerable to Simpson’s “paradox”. What Re´dei and Summers have shown is
that something formally analogous to this inadequate condition holds in AQFT. This
should only cause us to question whether the formal analogy, or anything like it,
captures anything physically interesting. It does not tell us anything about SO2,
finite or infinite.
Beyond this particular work, there are broader reasons for caution in comparing
results in the AQFT framework to that in [3]. The frameworks are far from equivalent.
Furthermore, definitions of causal principles analogous to SO1 and SO2 are not settled
in the AQFT framework, and different choices can lead to different results as to
whether AQFT obeys various causal principles (see for example [2]).
The underlying problem is that, in the SO1 and SO2 conditions, and other such
conditions such as Stochastic Einstein locality [2] and Bell’s own formulations, the
“events” being conditioned on can be said to describe something like Bell’s “beables”
[1]. AQFT is, on the other hand, an axiomatisation of an operational theory. In an
important sense, any decision on what a full specification of past events should be in
AQFT implicitly presupposes something about what the beables should be. AQFT
does not tell us what the beables should be. It does not even tell us whether they
should correspond to structures already in the AQFT framework or whether extra
structures should be added. For instance, in one case in which beables are added to
a lattice QFT, the results are manifestly non-local [6]. Thus any conclusions we can
reach here about locality, meaning lack of superluminal influence, are inextricably
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tied to another problematic aspect of the story, namely what there is to influence or
be influenced.
This should not be taken as an argument that defining conditions that are formally
analogous to SO1 and SO2 in other frameworks is always useless (some speculation
along these lines was made in [3] using the idea of the decoherence functional rather
than the AQFT framework). However, it is wrong to overinterpret such results as
saying anything about the probabilistic framework of [3], or for that matter, anything
decisive about locality in the above sense. To do the latter, it is at least necessary to
make sure that the causal condition used is physically sensible. This means taking
on the arguments surrounding Bell’s theorem more directly.
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